The Derby and Derbyshire Waste Treatment Centre – or the Sinfin Incinerator to Derby residents was built in recent years on Sinfin Lane, Derby UK after a protracted battle by the community starting in 2008/9 to stop the project being built.
The plan was to extract metals and hard plastics for recycling from incoming waste in the MRF (Materials Recovery Facility) although the target rate was less than 10%. The process was then to dry a percentage of the waste in an MBT (Mechanical Biological Treatment) and finally create RDF (Refuse Derived Fuel) which is then burnt (gasified to use the developers term) to produce steam to generate electricity for sale.
A percentage of the waste when burnt attracts ROC’s (Renewable Obligation Certificates) due to that percentage being biodegradable and so considered renewable.
The project it has been suggested has cost around £150 million which was funded via a series of banks including the Green Investment Bank. The project was based on Energos incineration technology using a gasification process which it was claimed had long standing operational history in Norway, Energos went into administration part way through the plants construction.
The Environment Agency permit the plant as an incinerator.
With such a
large budget and many aspects of the plant being supplied by experienced
technology developers and installers overseen by Interserve Construction you
would expect a smooth construction and commissioning process. Noting
the delay since first planned you would expect the project to develop
over time using new designs and technology as it came forward.
The plant
through the commissioning process has been a regular blight on the local
community creating odour, noise and fly issues which only ended when the
facility closed in August 2019.
The liaison group at the plant made up of councillors, resident members and staff from the councils and contractors along with guests such as the Environment Agency and Derbyshire Wildlife Trust sat through meeting after meeting while Interserve and Renewi kept talking about tests being completed etc. The talk was that the plant was weeks away from completing its tests – but it was always just weeks away from completing those tests.
Finally the councils pulled the plug on the contract – before awarding a replacement contract to Renewi – one of the parent companies of RRS who are now employed to clean and maintain the facility while trying to get the councils out of the mess they find themselves in.
The public
now have access to the full waste contract and Inter Authority Agreement after
the UK Information Commissioner ruled that the contracts should be made public (but that is another story).
it became clear there was a Service Delivery Plan that was put together around the time that the contract for the plant was terminated. A copy of this has since been provided by the plants liaison group including a faults list put together in October 2019
22/10/2019
The plants front end is the acceptance pit –
where the waste is tipped and then the MRF – Materials Recovery Facility where
waste is sorted to extract metals and rigid plastics and also the MBT
Mechanical Biological Treatment. This section was the starting point for waste
inputs and was the first section to have long term testing as commissioning was
taking place.
The report indicates it has not been
demonstrated that the front end MRF/MBT can provide enough RDF – Refuse Derived
Fuel to maintain performance of the ACT (the three incineration lines). This
led to the input pit overflowing delaying delivery of waste to the site – which
was seen at times at the site and in the local community.
Cranes in the MBT suffered repeat breakdowns.
MRF multiple breakdowns and blockages including
shredder breakdowns.
MRF – Not complying with the agreed facility
recycling target with no evidence that acceptance tests can be passed.
MRF target recycling rate was only 7.4% but
actual rate was just 4.8% with suggestions that 2019 tests not carried out
under normal operational conditions.
MRF recycling purity poor – document suggests
the lower the purity the higher performance – not rocket science – shove it
through to get material through the process will always lead to poor results.
MRF air knife used for sorting plastics
materials for recycling was failing as there were high levels of plastic film
in the rigid plastic bales.
ACT (Incineration lines) in previous 12 months
only processed 51% of the waste diversion target.
Each of the smoke tube boilers on each of the 3
line plant failed twice in commissioning.
ACT (Incineration lines) overheated when all 3
lines of the plant ran.
ACT (Incineration lines) overheating of CEMS –
CEMS is the monitoring. equipment – facility cannot lawfully operate if CEMS is
not operational.
ACT (Incineration hall) ambient temperature in
the hall caused an unsafe working environment.
Shotball system for cleaning boiler tubes
unreliable.
ACT (Incineration lines) numerous valve faults.
Kone Cranes – numerous faults causing
unreliable service.
Issues with access for maintenance.
Instrumentation not recording data due to being
set to simulation mode.
Alarms incorrectly set and inhibited.
Income from electrical generation significantly
lower than base case.
Significant risk that ROCs (Renewable
Obligation Certificates) will not be available.
Turbine appears to have a 2MW shortfall in
power production compared to that expected from design data.
Turbine and generator cannot be safely lifted
or removed.
Syngas analysers that are permanently installed
to gather data for ROCs do not work.
Ofgem audit relating to ROCs queries the basis
for accreditation.
Odours leading to non-compliance with
Environmental Permit and preventing use of onsite offices on welfare grounds.
Bio Filter not preventing odour emissions.
Fugitive emissions from MBT hall detected on
Sinfin Lane.
Fugitive emissions from MBT bunker detected in
B&Q and Sainsburys.
Fugitive emissions into administration block
make offices unusable. When ACT is shut down this includes into the control
room.
Carbon Monoxide in ash bunker and basement
requires vent system – no scientific or engineering data to back up the design
objectives.
Firewalls not completed / certified to allow
insurability and comply with fire protection plan.
Excess levels of noise.
Roller doors not safe to operate due to failed
components and design defects.
Recycling baler not fastening bales correctly
leading to safety issues.
Insufficient documentation to operate the plant
safely.
No Final Health and Safety file.
No commissioning records since Sept/Oct 2018.
Licence expired on optical sorters.
Education Centre sprinkler system not installed.
Leachate (liquids from waste) not draining from
waste pit.
Corrosion of structural steel in RDF pit.
Electrical Safety – junction boxes not earthed,
inadequate labelling.
It is not clear how a project overseen by multiple councils and contractors supported by paid advisors has managed to construct a £150 million white elephant which has now been closed for 18 months.
Councils often say that lessons will be learnt.
If ever there were lessons councils across the UK should learn from this saga it is do NOT take advice from Derby City and Derbyshire County Council's on waste management!
©SIMON BACON 2021